How should we react when AIDS, the swine flu, infertility, economic stagnation, natural disasters, revolutions, and a litany of other grievances are routinely blamed by Middle Eastern populations on the West—the United States and Israel in particular?

Because some of these accusations are so over the top—Mossad trained sharks—or we know them to be patently false—CIA behind the 9/11 attacks—Western analysts tend to dismiss such claims as the rantings of sadly misinformed oddballs:

Conspiracy theories are useful because they provide scapegoats through which disenfranchised societies and their rulers make sense of their predicament while crowding out inconvenient facts.  Accusations of “foreign hands,” Zionist plots, or imperialist (i.e. American) designs are conjured regularly by academics, government higher-ups, and the wider population alike with conviction inversely proportional to the availability of evidence.

Past history also plays a role.  The Middle East has been subject to foreign interference in the past, such as the overthrow of Iranian President Mohammed Mosssadeq in 1953 or the 1956 Suez invasion by Britain, France, and Israel, which makes modern day illusions seem more plausible.

Yes, America’s policy in the Middle East is sometimes counterproductive and has room for improvement.  But there is no policy adjustment that will accommodate grievances that arise from the belief that Americans or Zionists are responsible for every major ill from 9/11 to revolutions to natural disasters.

The problem in glossing over the impact of these lies, half-truths, distortions, and incitement directed at the West, including from our ostensible allies, is that we miss a defining factor of America’s relationship with the region.

How should our foreign policy deal with this challenge?

At the very least, we must acknowledge that some of our allies in the Middle East spread, tolerate, nurture, or co-opt anti-Western conspiracy theories and allow incitement through state media, schools, mosques, and even official communiques (see memri.org) in order to redirect public anger, sow discord among state enemies, and justify repression as a means of defense against nefarious foreign plots—real or imagined.

We should assess our allies’ intentions by what they say publicly to their own people and not the niceties their diplomats convey behind closed doors.  This means when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets with her Saudi counterpart, her assessment of the Saudi-American relationship will take into account what is preached in Saudi-sponsored mosques.  It means that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will not maintain the status of a peaceful moderate while he glorifies known terrorists. And so on.

This is not interference in domestic affairs.  It is a critical component of our national interest to insist that our allies, who are so devoted to influencing their domestic public opinion, desist from enabling anti-American animus.  And if we are serious about promoting the Arab-Israeli peace process, the same expectations must be applied to the anti-Semitism and denial of Israel’s legitimacy which is so common in this region.

People do not act on reality.  They act on their perceptions of reality.  While perceptions are influenced by much more than the efforts of regional governments, we will never win the battle for hearts and minds while our ostensible allies propagandize against us.  We must insist otherwise to secure our foreign policy interests.

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem and currently works for a political non-profit.

Interview with Middle East expert Dr. Walid Phares
by David Bratslavsky

 
I was recently in Washington D.C. and had the opportunity to speak with Dr. Walid Phares. He is an American scholar born in Beirut and frequent commentator on global terrorism and developments in the Middle East. Dr. Phares has testified before committees of the US Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Homeland Security, as well as Congress, UN Security Council, and the European Parliament. He is a frequent contributor to publications on international affairs and author of eleven books, the latest of which is The Coming Revolution: Struggle for Freedom in the Middle East.

What follows is a summary of our interview.

Q: What is the impact of bin Laden’s death?

A: It’s going to be a “game changer” that transgresses geopolitics and political division.

Number one impact is the US relationship with Pakistan. For bin Laden to be in a conspicuously fortified compound near a Pakistani military academy so close to the capital indicates that there was a shielding of bin Laden on some level within the intelligence apparatus of Pakistan. I personally project (unless proven wrong) that the government was not shielding him, but “there are segments of the national security apparatus within Pakistan which allowed this to happen.”

Although, a new theory is now emerging that segments of Pakistan’s ISI was in fact containing bin Laden in a type of house arrest. But up till what level in the intelligence and defense establishment it was covered, that we’ll have to discover. For it would be illogical that the top leaders pf the People’s Party in the cabinet would have endorsed a shielding of Bin Laden, as his group, the Taliban and the Jihadists in general were waging a terror campaign against them. In any event, the Pakistanis must have known at least of his presence inside Pakistan while svery few people knew of his presence there.

Q: What happens next?

A: Congress and the Administration are going to initiate a review of the relationship with the Pakistanis.

In this review I am calling for two things:

The Pakistani government must reform its intelligence services. Government policy is already on the right track. However, the ISI has a historically sympathetic relationship with Islamists in general and al-Qaeda in particular, which remains in some capacity today. As part of the reform, more action on al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistani territories is required.

US foreign policy must better identify and deal with the long term strategic threat to the US and the region. This analysis should clarify for the US that “there are two species of jihadis.” On the one hand there are the Salafists, al-Qaeda being the most extreme, and on the other hand is Iranian Islamism. I call on the US government administration to “start developing a national security doctrine which will see the threat as it is and not as it wants it to be.”

Q: How is the media in the Middle East reporting bin Laden’s death?

A: There are several kinds of media. Pro-Jihadist and Salafist media on the web and certain shows on Al-Jazeera are clearly anti-American. They are calling this an attack against Islam. The spin on bin Laden’s death is that he “wanted to die as a martyr” and “this will not change the course of al-Qaeda.”

For the most part, Al-Jazeera, although influenced by a Muslim Brotherhood-type outlook, is not making an issue of bin Laden’s death. They are making an issue of Pakistani sovereignty. They’re also advancing the point that now that bin Laden is dead, there is no reason for the US to be deployed in the region.

Q: How popular is this mindset?

A: Even if this viewpoint is not the majority, it is often the most vocal. We see this phenomenon in general with respect to Islamic fundamentalism. While civil society is generally moderate, the extremists are the most organized and the best equipped. I made the case for this in my last book, The Coming Revolution, which was published before the revolutions, in which I said that eventually all these societies are going to stand up. But at the same time, because they are not organized, “those who will harvest the revolution are the Islamists.” We see that now everywhere, including in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Q: Do we have a clear understanding of these dynamics in the West?

A: Many in Washington and the West have a bifurcated outlook. Some focus almost exclusively on the Islamist element and others focus almost exclusively on moderate civil society. We need a better analysis. What we have seen are truly popular revolutions on the onset. The Islamists on their own would not have been able to get hundreds of thousands into the streets. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt did not show up until the third or fourth day. At the same time, the tidal wave of popular outrage is then co-opted by more organized Islamist elements whose aim is to take over the leadership. The West and the United States in particular have to be smart in understanding these forces, in understanding who controls what.

We need to partner with the right people. Within Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Jordan, and even to some degree the Arabian peninsula, the US must determine what are the pro democracy and civil society elements in those societies.

Q: Why has the American establishment analysis been clouded in your opinion?

A: Over the past many years, the body of  experts serving the US foreign policy establishment “have not given the administration, the president, and Congress the right expertise.” In my book, Future Jihad, I describe how our academic expertise and the national security analysis that is derived from it is compromised. Most of those who give academic advice come from the universities, whose Middle East departments are funded to a large degree by petrodollar regimes with strings attached. Thus, we have generations that have been raised in the classroom with the ideas of apology for jihadism. In sum, this explains why the President and Congress did not have from their experts the right information on either the threat or the democracy forces in the region.

The bigger change has to be done not in the Middle East but here in Washington.

Q: Should the US have gone into Libya?

A: With the exception of genocide, there is no single principle by which to decide whether to enter a conflict. The other exception is helping defend an ally if we’re bound to do so by treaty. There is a ground to help the Libyan civil society defend itself against brutal oppression but at the same time the forces seeking democracy have to be identified clearly 

Q: Is the conflict in Libya a revolution or a tribal conflict?

The jury is still out on this. In the beginning these were popular demonstrations against Qadaffi inspired by Tunisia and Egypt. The response by the regime was so sharp and violent that it encouraged members of the armed forces to break away and join demonstrators from their tribe or home town who were harmed in Qadaffi’s response. When you have a split army fighting each other along tribal lines, it’s a civil war.

We know Qadaffi is a bad guy, but we must also understand who is there to replace him. In my analysis, the core of the revolution in Libya is made up of former diplomats, bureaucrats, military personnel, and intellectuals. However, a wide swath of rebels is made up of Islamist-inspired militias. The concern is that if this conglomeration of groups reach Tripoli, the Islamists “would overthrow the others and then declare a Taliban or Muslim Brotherhood inspired state.”

Q: Do you believe economic sanctions will dissuade Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?

A: “Sanctions are not a policy, they are tools of a policy.” To change the course of the Iranian regime, additional pressure must accompany sanctions. Sanctions worked against South Africa and may work against Syria along with other measures,  given the nature and interests of those countries. Iran, on the other hand, is interested in becoming a regional empire and a few sanctions will not dissuade them.

I am not even sure that more pressure will alter Iran’s course. Ultimately, what may required is regime change.
Some hold that they are against regime change in Iran because such change is accomplished through military action. Since they are against military action, by extension they oppose regime change.

But when we say regime change, it does not necessarily entail military action. The military option is for instances when national security is concerned. The other option, which I propose in my book, is to support the popular movement against the regime.

Q: Do you believe that the current US Administration failed to do this so far? 

A: “The Administration is not yet there.” They were given a great opportunity in June 2009 when 1.5 million people marked for reform in the streets of Iran. The beauty about it is that 60% of them were under the age of 20 and half of all demonstrators were females. This is unusual. When you have young protesters of both genders who are not proposing fundamentalism as a solution, you are in business with moderate civil society.

The Obama Administration did not go for it and I do not see in Washington a real change of direction yet. We’ll see a real change when the narrative, speeches, expertise, behavior, and funding priorities will change.
Q: Iranian public opinion surveys, to the degree that they are accurate, show a wide support for pursuing nuclear development. The issue is seen as a matter of national pride and defense across the political spectrum. Will a more moderate regime alter nuclear development given the popular base of support for it? 

A: If Iran was Italy or Poland, one would worry less about it seeking a nuclear segment of the economy or even a nuclear deterrent because those countries are committed to democratic ideals and norms.
Iran is a regime which has a stated goal to destroy Israel. To this effect, they support Hamas and Hezbollah and threaten use of missiles and gas. A nuclear weapon in the hands of such a regime is extremely detrimental to regional stability and to the West. What we need to see in Iran is not just a change of regime but of the political direction of that regime.
Currently, nuclear development is one way of expressing their national pride. Were they a practicing democracy, the Iranian regime would be focused on what to do with oil revenues, labor unions, and other quotidian concerns about the welfare of their citizens. In such an environment, Iranian nuclear ambitions could then be negotiated and they will likely find more productive ways of expressing their national dignity.

Ukraine provides a good example, since at one point it had nukes. It left the Soviet orbit and is developing as a democracy. The basis of their pride now revolves primarily around economic development.

The Iranian alternative, the Green movement, is another Iran. If this Iran takes over, I would be less inclined to see Iranian nuclear development as posing a problem. But if, say, another president replaces Ahmadinejad, this is not true reform. We need to see change at the level of Khamenei—not an Islamic republic, but just another democratic republic.

Q: Switching our focus for a moment, how will the recently announced Fatah-Hamas unity government affect prospects for Israeli-Palestinian peace?

A: First issue is how will the alter the Palestinian scene itself. It is unfortunate that Mahmoud Abbas accepted the deal of unifying Fatah and Hamas without even asking Hamas to reform. They have killed hundreds if not thousands of Palestinians in Gaza. In my opinion, Mahmoud Abbas has done a poor evaluation of events after the Egyptian revolution. He figured the Palestinians are not getting much from the Israelis and the United States is busy with other matters. These are legitimate concerns. The reaction to this was to go to the opposite pole of their position and join with Hamas.

What factored into this decision? The Egyptian revolution has brought the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) to have a significant influence on the Egyptian military, which is now going to be more supportive of Hamas, and MB offshoot. Also, since Hamas is going to be supported by a Sunni regional power, they are expected to move away from Iran. The thinking was that if Fatah connects with Hamas, they will be at equal distance from the Egyptians. This is a big mistake because in Egypt there will be a struggle between MB on the one hand and the moderates on the other. The military will aim to survive and maintain the dollars coming from the US. Palestinian interests are not their primary concern.

My view is that the military is allowing this level of MB influence for peculiar reasons. The MB has a lot of embarrassing information on the military establishment about their financial involvement in the Egyptian economy. As a result, the military is trying to establish an understanding with the MB while keeping an equal distance from the United States. The military does not fear distancing from Israel because it does not receive any tangible support from them. With respect to maintaining peace, the US will anyone come and moderate between the US and Israel because it is important to them.

In short, Egypt will not be as important a partner as the United States for the Palestinians. Mahmoud Abbas should have instead built a direct relationship with the United States, and that would have been his guarantee to continue negotiations with the Israelis. As for the original question, my feeling is that Hamas will eat the PLO and not the other way around in this instance.

Q:  Does that change European policy?
The Europeans are divided. We have the classical more “progressive” Europeans who will continue to be with Hamas, albeit in a very limited way. There are also Europeans who are concerned with the rise of Islamism worldwide. The politics in Europe are moving slightly right, while the political establishment remains tilted to the left. In other words, the majority of the elites in Europe are on the progressive/left while the majority of the public is going in another direction. At some point there will be a political clash within Europe. That is why official Europe considers Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood as acceptable partners, but the emerging Europe will be very different.

David Bratslavsky comments on US foreign policy and the Middle East.  Follow StreetSmartPolitics on Facebook and Twitter.

What really bothers London?
by Adi Schwarts

How come the UK is more concerned with issues of human rights in Israel, than in Syria, Libya or Egypt?

The British Foreign Office published at the end of March its annual Human Rights and Democracy report for 2010. One could have imagined that due to the tremendous ongoing turmoil in the Arab world, Britain would prioritize promoting human rights issues exactly there. The whole world’s eyes are fixated since last December not only on the cruel brutality of Arab autocratic regimes facing huge demonstrations, but also on the decades-long systemic violations of basic human rights that sent so many millions of people to the streets in the first place.

But it seems that the British Foreign Office has a different agenda.

Most of the official document is dedicated to 26 “countries of concern”, but Egypt, for example, is not one of them. It is the most populated Arab country, with paramount regional importance. It is also a place where tens of thousands of people were arrested and tortured by virtue of the draconic emergency law enacted in 1981, and it is where the ruling party managed to get more than 80 percent of the votes in the elections in December 2010. But Egypt is apparently not concerning enough, and does not merit a chapter of its own.

The few references to Egypt appear in a handful of paragraphs, and all in all there are no more than 778 words dedicated to the country. Would the 846 Egyptians that lost their lives in the uprising write the same report?

And who are the 26 countries that do bother Britain? One of the most prominent of those is Israel, with a long and detailed chapter (2,918 words). A bit less worrying apparently is the situation in Syria, the same one which Bashar Assad is currently flooding with rivers of blood (2,647 words). Even less worrying is the situation in Libya, where according to Western officials more than 10,000 people lost their lives, some of whom were shelled with cluster bomb by the Kaddafi regime (1,772 words).

Israel and Colombia are the only democratic states among the 26 “countries of concern”. The report is very careful not to criticize any other Western or democratic state, despite many human rights violations by them in 2010, such as killings of civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan by the American army, the inhuman conditions in which immigrants and asylum seekers are held in Greece, the deportation of thousands of Roma from France, and so on. None of these, it seems, bothers Britain.

The document has a very brief and gentle reference to the Guantanamo detention camp. Regarding a British resident held there, Shaker Aamer, the document politely states: “Ultimately, any decision regarding Mr Aamer’s release remains in the hands of the US government”.

The report states in its introduction that “it is not an exhaustive list, nor should it be seen as a league table”. Nonetheless, someone in the Foreign Office had to decide which countries to include in it. Someone also had to decide how elaborate and detailed should every chapter be. And after all this decision making process, the British Foreign Office concluded that Israel is worth a much longer discussion than Syria, Libya and Egypt.

In order to understand better the rationale behind this thinking, I approached the British Embassy in Tel Aviv with a few questions:

1. Why is Israel considered a “country of concern”?
2. Since Israel and Colombia are the only democratic countries in the report – is Britain not concerned by human rights violations in any other democratic country?
3. How come there’s more on Israel in the report than on countries with far worse human rights record?

The Embassy ignored the second and the third questions, and sent the following response to the first question: “The featured countries of concern are those countries where we had the most serious and wide-ranging human rights concerns during 2010, but it is not an exhaustive list. When deciding on which countries to include, we also considered whether highlighting that country could have broader positive impacts in the wider region should their human rights record improve”.

It is hard to know if Britain fully understands how severe a blow to its reputation is a report that treats Kaddafi and Assad in a lighter way than it treats Israel. What is crystal clear, however, and is even worse, is the harm done to the justified cause of fighting for human rights. If remorseless leaders such as Kaddafi and Assad are of less concern to London than Israel, then who will hold them accountable?

If someone really wanted to promote the cause of human rights, he would write a totally different document.

Adi Schwartz is a journalist, author, and editor.  He is a Monocle Magazine correspondent in Israel and also blogs on www.adi-schwartz.com.

Interview with Gil Hoffman, Chief Political Correspondent for the Jerusalem Post
by David Bratslavsky

Gil Hoffman is the chief political correspondent and analyst for The Jerusalem Post. I met him in Cincinnati, where he spoke on recent developments in the Middle East. What follows is a synopsis of our interview together (4/5/2011) with the full audio transcript. (Note: Audio was edited due to phone interruptions, but contains full responses) .

Q: Netanyahu, Abbas, and Obama all agree in theory on the need for peace through a two-state solution. Why is there currently no progress on this issue?

A: America mishandled the peace process. Obama thought that pressure on Israel with regards to settlements, including those settlement that would remain as part of Israel under proposed agreements, would make the Palestinians more willing to make concessions. This policy backfired by creating a confrontation with Israel and making Palestinian demands less conciliatory, since Abbas could not be seen as demanding less than the US. Even though America has backed down from its demands, the Palestinians never did. The other reason Palestinians do not come to the negotiating table is that the international community gave indications that Palestinian statehood may be recognized at the UN General Assembly even without a negotiating process toward peace.

Q: What will restart the peace process?

A: The world must make clear to the Palestinians that the only way to achieving statehood is at the negotiating table and that Netanyahu is willing to go a lot farther than they may think if given the opportunity. The Palestinian Authority may need another election, currently schedule for September, before progress can be made.

Q: Is progress at the negotiation table possible while Israel’s settlement policies continue?

A: Settlements are not the issue. Israel froze construction for 10 months with little effect on Palestinian willingness to negotiate. Negotiations are necessary to determine boundaries. At that point it will be clear where each party can build housing. Israel and the Palestinians were negotiating since 1993. Only since settlements were made the primary issue by Obama did Palestinians start using it as a pretext not to negotiate.

Q: The peace process is predicated on a “land for peace” formula. If Abbas in the West Bank cannot guarantee peace and Hamas will not guarantee peace from Gaza, what is Israel’s incentive to consider further land concessions?

A: Netanyahu made clear that one of the conditions for statehood is that the area would be demilitarized under the supervision of the international community and that Palestinians would recognize Israel as a Jewish state to denote a complete end of the conflict. The arrangement necessitates a leader on the Palestinian side that could enforce this. Currently in Gaza this is not the case. In the West Bank it’s debatable.

Q: What can you tell us about Israel’s Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman?

A: I cannot share personal opinions on the issue since I cover internal Israeli politics and must remain objective. As leader of the second largest party in the coalition Lieberman chose the Foreign Ministry portfolio. He has made clear that Israel can make concessions only to a genuine partner on the other side, which he believes Abu Mazen (Abbas) is not. Israel’s last election was during a war which helped propel Lieberman’s popularity. Currently his influence is “negligible.” He is not involved with the negotiations or the US-Israel relationship, instead focusing on improving Israel’s relationship with Eastern Europe, Africa, and South America.

Q: The removal of Mubarak from power in Egypt has allowed all segments of Egyptian society, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to participate in the formation of a new government. What is likely to be the nature of the new Egyptian government and how will this affect Egypt’s relations with Israel?

A: Israelis are concerned that the Muslim Brotherhood will win Egypt’s parliamentary elections, allowing them to reorient policy away from the West and toward Iran. Israel now sees the potential to be invaded from all sides at the same time, a situation it did not have to deal with for the last 30 years. And yet, if Egyptians elect a moderate leadership, it will be better for both countries.

Q: What do you make of Egypt allowing two Iranian warships to pass through the Suez Canal, which hasn’t happened since 1979, and the foreign minister reestablishing diplomatic relations with Iran? Do these actions signal a reorientation of Egyptian priorities vis-a-vis the West?

A: “This is a transitional period. Egypt is led by a temporary government, and I wouldn’t look too closely at what they’re doing right now.”

Q: Is there a diplomatic and/or economic solution to Iran’s nuclear development?

A: The world has tried several approaches thus far. The political approach was hindered by Iran’s undemocratic elections. The diplomatic approach of reaching out to Iran’s dictators at the expense of their people did not bear fruit. Now the world is in the middle of an economic approach with sanctions. It is possible it could work if the sanctions are tightened, better enforced, and come with a credible military threat. If Iran’s leaders are told that what’s happening in Lybia—air campaign without boots on the ground—can happen in Iran, the economic approach may work and there will not be a need for military action.

Q: Does US action in Libya stretch America’s military even further, thereby undermining the credibility of a military option against Iran?

A: Never underestimate the power of the United States. They led the campaign against Libya for two weeks and handed responsibility off to NATO. American now has more strength. Also, they are well positioned on the Persian Gulf.

Q: How will the action in Libya affect Israel?

A: Libya and Israel are unrelated matters. There is a concern in Israel that American resources that should be in reserve to counterbalance Iran are being used in Libya, there is enough American power to go around.

Q: A column published in The Jerusalem Post put forward the theory that Europe will aim to please the Arab street by putting pressure on Israel as a way for diverting anger from the Arab street for attacks on Libya.

A: Europe will pressure Israel no matter what. What’s happening in Libya is unrelated to Israel and largely a waste of resources by the West.

Q: What makes European pressure on Israel inevitable?

A: Europe has not gone through a 9/11 attack and fails to realize that there is a battle between Islamic fundamentalism and the West. There is an impatience with making peace without understanding the realities undermining this goal. Israel has to deal with these realities on a daily basis in order to protect its citizens.

Full Audio:   Gil Hoffman of The Jerusalem Post (4/5/2011)

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem. Become a Facebook fan of Street Smart Politics.  Follow on Twitter.

Rebel forces have taken over cities in Libya as Gadhafy declares “my people love me.”   Whatever the outcome of these battles, I believe Egypt more than Libya will help determine the fate of the Middle East.  Thus, I would like to offer a few additional thoughts on Egypt, even though media attention has shifted for now.

We have all seen the story.  In eighteen short days 30 years of Hosni Mubarak’s reign as president has come to an end. There is a deserved sense of triumph among Egyptians.  But this is just the first chapter of a developing saga.  Political stagnation, widespread corruption, economic inequality, abusive security forces, a 30% illiteracy rate, joblessness, and a litany of other legitimate grievances will not be addressed in Tahrir Square. These issues cannot be dealt with through slogans, populist rhetoric, religious salvation, or conspiracy theories. And they will not be resolved overnight, if indeed they are resolved.

A lot must occur to enable Egyptian reform. Democratic safeguards–free press, independent judiciary, protected constitution, independent political parties, protection of minority rights—are not yet present.  For example, deep-seated discrimination against minorities such as Copts remains.  Without minority protection and the rule of law, Egypt faces the prospect of either mob rule or exploitation of the democratic process by a new set of tyrants.

The army will soon retreat into the political background where it can maintain popularity while protecting its vast business interests. A nascent civil society will have to fill the political void. For now, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized political opposition.  This raises a few questions and concerns.  Will Egyptians build resilient democratic institutions that enable progress or will religious fundamentalism or populism reign the day? What will the inclusion of Islamist parties in the government mean for women, minorities, and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty?  Will elections infuse fresh blood into the political system or will the old guard remain under a new label?

How Egyptians deal with these issues will determine the fate of the Middle East.  Egyptian protests have bolstered the resolve of others in the region.  A disappointing outcome will serve as a harsh lesson. If democracy becomes synonymous with turbulence, indecision, and shattered hopes, the remaining tyrants will have evidence as to why oppressive stability trumps democracy.

Whatever government emerges, it must have space to craft its own policies.  At the same time, the US should unequivocally communicate that anti-Western populism will not be appreciated and stress how both sides benefit from close bilateral relations.  Respecting “the will of the people” does not mean acquiescing to developments that are detrimental to our national interest.

Trusted partners like the spy chief Omar Suleiman (a graduate of the US Special Warfare School in Fort Bragg) have been removed from their positions.  Cooperation on important international issues such as Iranian nuclear development will diminish. In fact, an emboldened Iran will jostle for input. Similar to what happened in Afghanistan after the Taliban and in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, Iran will aim to exploit the US freedom agenda to gain influence in a formerly hostile state. Already Egypt has let two Iranian war ships into the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal, the first such voyage since 1979.

While respecting the democratic process the US should not be naive about Egypt’s immediate limitations.  We must aim to influence reform in a positive manner before others fill that role to our detriment.  We already spend billions subsidizing Egypt’s army and government.  By also underwriting emerging civil institutions, something largely avoided thus far, we can increase the possibility that Egypt’s liberal revolution remains liberal.

One important consideration of US foreign policy is the American brokered Egypt-Israel peace treaty. The agreement looks safe for now, if only because $1.3 billion dollars a year of Egypt’s military aid is tied to it.  Egypt no less than Israel, wants to avoid war and border confrontations.  However, relations with Israel will undoubtedly worsen as strong anti-Israel and anti-Semitic sentiment is calculated into government policy. A 2010 Pew Poll found that 95% of Egyptians held an ‘unfavorable view’ of Jews (compared with only 35% of Israeli Arabs). And in a 2007 Pew survey, an overwhelming 80% of Egyptians said that the needs of the Palestinians could never be accommodated so long as Israel exists.  Protesters in Tahrir square were actively chanting “To Jerusalem we’re heading, martyrs in the millions.” In a democracy, this attitude will translate into action. For example, a new government may quit helping contain Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot. Egypt’s role as an example of Arab-Israeli peace will cease if Egyptian hostility is reflected in government policy.

The jury is still out on the ultimate success of the Egyptian revolt.  How Egyptians define success will matter as much as whether they achieve it.

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem. Become a Facebook fan of Street Smart Politics.  Follow on Twitter.

As far as graceful exits go, this one isn’t.   Al Arabia reports that deposed Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak fell into a coma shortly after his last speech as president, in which he handed over executive authority to his VP/spy chief Omar Suleiman.  According to the report, he is receiving medical treatment at his residence in Sharm el Sheikh.

This follows reports from a week ago in Der Spiegel that the US was helping arrange a “prolonged health check” in a German hospital as a possible exit strategy for Mubarak.  Mubarak is 82 and has health issues.  It is even rumored that he may have cancer.  But it remains difficult to believe his well timed coma.

Mubarak’s resignation was announced one day after he delivered an energetic speech signaling his intent to stay until the September elections.  His abrupt departure was a clear sign of an internal military coup, not a coma.

Had Mubarak understood the full extent of the opposition protests and reconciled with the fact that his time to leave had come, he could have still salvaged a decent exit.  He could have expressed understanding of the protesters’ wishes (which is what he did), but maintained that Egypt needs an orderly transition, which would be facilitated by his departure in a month’s time followed by military rule until the next elections.  He would have bowed out to pressure and given up transitional power to the military before the election, but done so on his own time table, thereby retaining a modicum of dignity.  Now he has to flee under the cover of coma.

Perhaps in response to the brave new world created by Egyptian protests, Mubarak is relying on Aldous Huxley’s formula for a graceful exit.  “Ignore death up to the last moment; then, when it can’t be ignored any longer, have yourself squirted full of morphia and shuffle off in a coma.  Thoroughly sensible, humane and scientific, eh?” suggests a character in Huxley’s Time Must Have a Stop. In a region that believes shark attacks to be evidence of a Mossad plot, a conveniently timed coma is hardly a stretch.  Or perhaps having left an impoverished country with $70 billion to his name (though I doubt this figure is accurate), Mubarak laughed himself into an actual coma.

In any case, Mubarak is out.  The people’s voice has been heard.   Of course the question remains, now what?  Let’s hope that in his supposedly dreamy state, Mubarak won’t have the last laugh.

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem. Become a Facebook fan of Street Smart Politics.  Follow on Twitter.

Is there a possibility that Egyptian protests, like the Tunisian protests for Egypt, will lead to similar results in other Arab countries? Here’s what’s brewing:

Syria

Facebook pages are popping up calling for Syrians to follow the Egyptian example, which also sparked protests via social media and the blogosphere.  Syria has about 7.8% (as of 2008) internet penetration, which is roughly equal to Egypt’s.  Despite Facebook being officially banned in Syria, access can be obtained via proxy servers.  According to a MEMRI report:

In the past week, Syrian activists have been using Facebook to call for mass protests in Syria on Saturday, February 5, 2011, dubbing it the “Day of Rage.” In Facebook pages created specifically for this purpose, members have called on the Syrian public to take to the streets on that date and stage peaceful demonstrations and rallies in all parts of the country, as well as in front of Syrian embassies in Arab and European capitals, in protest of the oppressive Syrian regime.

Syrian authorities have prepared the security forces.  They already dispersed one solidarity protest on Saturday.  The President, Bashar al-Assad, is raising fuel subsidies and tightening control on the internet to mollify public discontent and stem possible unrest.

Jordan

King Hussein dismissed his cabinet and appointed Marouf Bakhit as the new Prime Minister.  However, the protests in Jordan have been largely calling for reform rather than regime change.  According to a report in LA Times:

Even the Islamic Action Front, Jordan’s main opposition group and a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, has denounced the kind of regime change being called for in Egypt.

Saudi Arabia
Protests have spread to Saudi Arabia, but are relatively small and focused on demanding infrastructure improvements and an end to corruption.  Video of the protests below:

While protests point to widening discontent in the Arab world, each country’s predicament is unique. Yemen was already in turmoil before Tunisia/Egypt. Algerian protesters continue to organize but its not yet clear what they will achieve. In Saudi Arabia, people are orders of magnitude wealthier due to the country’s oil, which means there is less discontent. Protests were relatively small and easily dispersed. Jordanians focused their anger on the recently dismissed Prime Minister rather than the monarchy, the true source of power. It is difficult to read Syria’s public mood from available news reports. No doubt there is much frustration, but the chances of mass protests leading to an overthrow of the government are infinitesimal. Of course, that was the consensus about Egypt not too long ago. US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks quote the US Ambassador’s view that Mubarak will “inevitably” win the next presidential election and stay in office for life.

The protests are indeed exciting. A tired people standing up to oppressive rules; change coming to a stale and recalcitrant region.  But no matter how valid the objections, change is not automatically for the best. To close, a sobering piece in Slate.com by Shmuel Rosner (a former guest of StreetSmartPolitics.com):

Revolutions can bring chaos, or failure, or even more oppression, or radical Islamization, or terrible violence. They create opportunity not just for the good guys (human rights activists) but also for the bad guys (Hezbollah, Iran). They take time and patience and determination and planning and, yes, caution. And while there’s very little most observers can do to help them succeed, the least they can do is greet the revolution that is unfolding in their living rooms with wariness rather than a reality-show response of juvenile glee.

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem. Become a Facebook fan of Street Smart Politics.  Follow on Twitter.

The week long protests in Cairo have led to the resignation of President Mubarak‘s cabinet and the appointment of Omar Suleiman as Vice President and Ahmed Shafik as Prime Minister.  This shakeup can be interpreted in several ways.

One, Mubarak knows his rule is over and is setting up a graceful exit while trying to avoid anarchy.

Two, by appointing military men long part of of his inner circle, Mubarak is signaling that his regime is here to stay. Suleiman is a former general and head of Egypt’s General Intelligence Service since 1993. Shafik is a former air force commander (like Mubarak) and headed Egypt’s Civil Aviation since 2002. With these appointments, Mubarak is also sending a message to the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood that a strongman policy against the group will continue.

Three, the appointments are necessities of internal politics, imposed by the military as a condition for taking over crowd control and protecting Mubarak. A similar scenario happened in the ‘bread riots‘ of 1977 when the army agreed to step in to quell protests only after then-President Anwar Sadat agreed to reinstate bread subsidies. The military has been a political institution and the bedrock of the Egyptian regime since a military coup overthrew King Farouk I to establish the republic in 1952.  As part of the military establishment, Suleiman and Shafik are now more in charge than Mubarak himself.

What are the consequences of the protests?

The Muslim Brotherhood is not behind the demonstrations but has joined in and will look to take advantage of the turmoil in order to position themselves as the leading alternative to Mubarak’s regime. They are the best organized political opposition group with strong grassroots support propagated mostly through mosques and religious institutions. Their adoption of the freedom agenda and support for democracy reflect the calculated sense that a popular vote will be to their benefit. Similarly, Khomeini espoused democracy while riding popular sentiment to power in Iran’s 1979 revolution only to do away with it once in control. Should the Brotherhood gain significant power, their moderation and commitment to democratic ideals are likely to evaporate as they advance their agenda. They espouse sharia law and have strong anti-American and anti-Israel undertones. Egypt’s alliance with the United States, peace treaty with Israel, and embargo against Hamas (an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza) are likely to disintegrate under the Brotherhood’s leadership.

However, the Brotherhood’s ascendancy to power is not a forgone conclusion.  While their historic 88 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections solidified the group’s force, their strength may be tempered.  The secular national army has so far avoided clashing with the people, generating some sense of solidarity. The military establishment may still be able to assuage public sentiment and maintain power, at least as part of an interim government. The longer the chaos continues, the more the Egyptian middle class will seek stability, which only the army can provide. But it is not clear how the military can diffuse the situation without arranging for the departure of Mubarak and either promising fair elections or enacting sweeping reforms, none of which is yet to happen.

The secular opposition is strong but diffuse. Mohammad El Baradei, a Nobel laureate and former head of UN’s IAEA, returned to the country last year and is positioning himself as the leader of the pro-democracy opposition. Since El Baradei is a public persona in largely amorphous protests, the secular opposition is uniting around him. However, he has been out of the country for too long to have established deep support and may be seen as opportunistic and too ‘intellectual’ to generate wide appeal.

The ideal scenario for the United States is anything that tempers the tide of Islamism and keeps Egypt in a pro-American alliance. But any such solution must also been seen as legitimate by Egyptians.  It is unlikely that the new military establishment will be able to accomplish this short of allowing for real elections.  The US must therefore work to ensure fair elections while giving the secular pro-American voice the financial means and tacit support to organize. This does not mean the US should bet on one horse in this race. Rather, it should quietly align itself with all groups that would maintain good bilateral relations. This includes the current military establishment, especially Suleiman (a graduate of the U.S. Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg). This scenario would also require the US to use whatever leverage it has left to privately urge Mubarak to transition out of government, if not immediately then soon.  The US must then work with the new government to insist on the development of strong civil institutions that would temper extremism and extend democratic reforms beyond one election.

Flying from New York a few days ago, I met a lovely Egyptian woman on her way back from Cairo. She pointed out, “Amazing what change a few days can bring to a timeless place like Egypt.” Indeed.  Having spent a summer in Egypt in 2006, I have fond memories of a welcoming people.  My sincere hope is that the final outcome of this chaos ends with little additional bloodshed and a positive path forward, first and foremost for the Egyptian people.

David Bratslavsky analyzes US foreign policy and the Middle East. He studied politics, language and religion in Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, Cairo and Jerusalem.  He may be reached at contact@streetsmartpolitics.com. Become a Facebook fan of Street Smart Politics.  Follow on Twitter.

A couple weeks ago I commented on the Egyptian parliamentary elections and the effect that political stagnation in Egypt has on the United States.  The Wall Street Journal reports that Secretary of State Clinton is now embarking on a Mid-East tour of Arab states allied with the US, with the goal of promoting political reform:

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will press key Arab states this week to further open up their political systems, according to U.S. officials, amid what analysts say are growing signs that democratic reforms in parts of the strategic Middle East have stagnated.

The Obama administration has been criticized by democracy activists over the past two years for not pushing Arab leaders from Cairo to Amman to more aggressively pursue political openness. But the chief American diplomat’s mission will be complicated, say Mideast analysts, by recent political and social turmoil engulfing some of Washington’s closest strategic partners in the region, including Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria.

WSJ’s foreign affairs correspondent and deputy editorial page editor, Bret Stephens, comments on how Egyptian politicians, public figures, and government controlled media are attempting to deflect criticism by casting events such as shark attacks, sectarian violence, and even al-Qaeda as Zionist plots.  This phenomenon is not new and not specific to Egypt.  While such conspiracy theories are humorous in their overreach, they also underscore a desperate inability of Arab states to accept accountability and deal with festering social, political, and economic issues head on.

The dangers of political stagnation in Arab countries reaches beyond their borders and directly affects US interests and security.  As for Egypt, notes Stephens:

For the West, it means an Egypt that resembles nothing so much as Iran in the waning days of the Shah, in which a comparatively moderate regime led by a sickly despot confronts a restive and radical public.

The last thing the United States needs right now is an Iran-style Islamist revolution.  While there is no immediate danger of that happening in Egypt or other regional states aligned with the US (with the possible exception of Tunisia), the region is not exactly stable.  Continued stagnation in Arab states is forcing their public to seek alternative forms of government.  More often than not, as with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the alternative is more dangerous than the status quo.  Since protests and rigged elections are ineffective in effecting change, extremism and revolution become a tempting “solution.”

This predicament leaves the US trying to balance good relations with our Arab allies while pressuring them to make tough but necessary internal reforms.

Democracy promotion in the Middle East was a cornerstone of the second Bush administration post 9/11.  But support for this policy waned as America faced increasing complications in Iraq.  In his outreach to the Muslim world, President Obama has also muted support for political reforms which peeve Arab governments.  Secretary Clinton’s trip may signal a more engaged approach.   And yet, one trip is unlikely to yield any but cosmetic reforms.  What will be required is a deliberate, sustained effort on the part of the United States to make political reform in the Arab world a top priority.  Given how much such pestering aggravates the Arab governments whose support in the region we continue to seek, it remains to be seen whether the current US administration will sustain this effort or pitch it in favor of government-to-government cooperation on other regional issues.

A little past the news cycle on this one, but still quite important. Egypt’s parliamentary elections were held on November 28 (first round) and December 5 (second round). Only 25% of the people voted.

Foreign Policy’s Max Strasser‘s account gives a good impression as to why.

Egypt’s parliamentary elections went off today basically as expected, with vote buying, voter intimidation and fraud the norm across the country despite protests.

Out of the 444 ordinary seats being contested (other seats are reserved or appointed), 420 were won by President Hosni Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party. The party in second place received just 6 seats.

What would constitute an improvement toward democracy?

Michal Posner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor has a few suggestions for Mubarak:

Free and fair elections require free and vibrant media; that includes bloggers and international coverage. The Egyptian government could also do more to encourage a broader array of political parties and to support citizens who want to form nongovernmental organizations to contribute to their country’s future. It will also be important for Egypt to welcome both international and domestic election monitors and allow them to carry out their work freely throughout the campaign period and on Election Day next September.

But what would happen should Egypt suddenly allow fair representative democracy?

With pressure from the second Bush administration, which pushed democratization of the Middle East as an antidote to extremism after 9/11, Egypt allowed for freer elections in 2005. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), running as Independents due to their official ban in Egypt, won an unprecedented 88 seats in Parliament.

MB is the most organized opposition in Egypt. What is their goal? The replacement of all states between Spain and Indonesia with an Islamic Caliphate run according to Sharia (Islamic religious law).

The government of Sudan, which perpetrated the atrocities in Darfur, is run by MB.  Palestinian Hamas, with a stated goal of destroying Israel, is an offshoot of MB. In an example of what could happen in Egypt should elections be truly and suddenly free, Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian parliament in 2006, then took over Gaza by force and severely complicated peace efforts with Israel.

Besides Egypt, where the group was founded, MB operates in all parts of the Middle East and even planted roots in America. A 1991 FBI raid on an Islamic charity funneling funds to Hamas found a 19 page manifesto detailing MB’s goals in America. The key paragraph is below:

The process of settlement [of Islam in the United States] is a “Civilization-Jihadist” process with all the word means. The Ikhwan [Brotherhood] must understand that all their work in America is a kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and “sabotaging” their miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion is made victorious over all religions. Without this level of understanding, we are not up to this challenge and have not prepared ourselves for Jihad yet. It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny except for those who choose to slack.

Free and fair elections would most certainly allow MB to gain significant powers in the Egyptian government.

The New Republic’s Leon Wieseltier writes about the dilemma of Egyptian democracy (and I suggest his piece be read in full):

In these terms I wrestled for a long time with the question of the democratization of Egypt. The authoritarian immobilism of the Mubarak regime lacks all legitimacy. But in view of the alternative, does it lack all utility? The question is not cynical. The parliamentary elections last week were preceded by a repression: Mubarak’s National Democratic Party cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, arresting 1,200 of its supporters and barring some of its candidates from running. Then came the election, in which the Muslim Brotherhood, which had 88 members in parliament, discovered that its number of seats had been reduced to zero. This wild fraud is a premonition of what awaits Egypt in its presidential election next year. The outrage is obvious. But so is the complication. In standing up for the opposition, for the victims of the dictator, we are standing up for the Muslim Brotherhood.

So do we maintain consistency in our promotion of democracy, come what may? If not, then is selective promotion of democracy hypocritical or simply prudent? Is there a middle ground? Wieseltier again:

“…in recent months I have become increasingly convinced by another consideration. It is that the Muslim Brotherhood’s surest road to power in Egypt lies in the absence of any political reform. It is Mubarak who, by alienating his people and denying their rights, will bring the worst to pass. We have been here before. I still recall the catastrophic fall of American policy toward Iran in 1979. We had looked away, and condoned, and prevaricated, and excused—and only when it was too late, when the Shah was gone—what did it matter that he was a friend of the United States and a friend of Israel, if he doomed those friendships by his manner of governance?—and Khomeini’s mobs were taking over the streets—only then did we seek an alternative. Now I have the sickening feeling that if the United States continues to acquiesce in Mubarak’s tyranny, we will soon be searching Cairo for its Bakhtiar, and then wondering who lost Egypt.”

In other words, the ideal alternative and solution to Egypt’s stagnation is not the current political opposition, it is progress. The US has considerable leverage over Egypt. We provide Billions of dollars every year in military and development support. The question is how we use this leverage. So far the Obama administration has been ostentatiously mum in raising the necessary but touchy issue of human rights, political reform, and sensible democratization.  Obama has slashed funding for democratic and political reform by 50%, at a time when it is perhaps needed most.  In the 2011 presidential election, the 82 year old Mubarak is likely to step down as president. Even if his son Gamal, who is rumored to be groomed for succession, becomes the new president, the change of administrations in Egypt creates a window of opportunity to reset expectations in the direction of political and economic reform. Let us hope that our administration takes this opportunity to heart, for Egypt’s sake and for ours.